Concert or Cacophony? In Search of a New International Order. Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011 by Glosserman, Brad et al.
Concert or Cacophony?
In Search of a New International Order 
Brad Glosserman, Peter Walkenhorst, Ting Xu   
Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction: 
Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011

3Contents
1	 Introduction	 4
2	 Key	Findings	 6
	 2.1	 Global	Governance	Is	Not	Working	 6
	 2.2	 Incrementalism	to	the	Rescue	 8
	 2.3	 Regional	Perspectives	 10
	 2.4	 Agents	of	Change	 16
3	 Conclusions	 20
4	 The	Way	Forward	 22
5	 List	of	Participants	 24
6	 Agenda	 26
	 About	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	and	the	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	 30
	 Imprint	 31
Concert or Cacophony?
In Search of a New International Order 
Report on the Trilateral Practitioners Workshop “Creative Destruction:  
Toward an Effective International System”, Berlin, July 7-8, 2011
Brad Glosserman, Peter Walkenhorst, Ting Xu
4 1 Introduction
The	global	order	has	been	in	flux	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	
Two	fundamental	trends	are	reshaping	the	international	system:	
Power	 shifts	 at	 the	 global	 level	 are	 creating	 a	 more	 diverse	
international	 order,	 in	 which	 emerging	 and	 resurgent	 players	
pursue	 and	 assert	 their	 own	 interests.	 While	 it	 is	 not	 clear	
whether	 Western	 economic,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 dominance	
is	coming	to	an	end,	 there	 is	no	mistaking	the	world’s	growing	
pluralism.	At	the	same	time,	the	emerging	international	concert	
–	or	cacophony	–	is	characterized	by	deepening	interdependence.	
All	major	 (and	minor)	 powers	 are	 facing	 challenges	 of	 economic	 growth,	 energy	 security,	 and	
environmental	sustainability,	all	of	which	are	intimately	interconnected	and	which	no	nation	can	
successfully	confront	on	its	own.	Moreover,	the	pace	at	which	change	is	occurring	is	accelerating,	
requiring	 decision	makers	 to	move	 faster	 at	 the	 very	 time	 that	 problems	 are	 becoming	more	
complex.	 This	 creates	 a	 fundamental	 dilemma	 as	 managing	 this	 interdependence	 through	
multilateral	cooperation	demands	enlightened	self-interest	when	established	means	of	interaction	
are	being	undermined.	Thus,	the	interaction	of	shifting	power	and	increasing	interdependence	is	
transforming	global	politics,	pushing	it	towards	an	unprecedented	configuration	of	international	
relations.	
Effective	global	 governance	 is	difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	when	
a	 new	 international	 order	 is	 emerging.	 The	 emergence	 of	
powers	such	as	China,	India,	and	Brazil	in	conjunction	with	the	
resurgence	of	Russia	and	the	seeming	decline	of	the	United	States	
and	 Europe	 have	 increased	 the	 number	 of	 global	 and	 regional	
players	 (including	 regional	 organizations	 and	 arrangements),	
reducing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 effective	 policy	 coordination	 among	
them.	 Diverging	 interests	 as	 well	 as	 diverse	 perspectives	
on	 how	 to	 approach	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 emerging	 and	
longstanding	 issues	 on	 the	 international	 agenda	 have	 led	 to	
greater	fragmentation	of	world	politics.	As	a	result,	the	prospects	
for	effective	global	governance	–	broadly	defined	as	the	collective	
management	 of	 common	 problems	 at	 the	 international	 and	
transnational	level	–	are	deteriorating	because	challenges	on	the	global	agenda	are	increasing	in	
number,	scale,	and	complexity	at	the	very	time	that	international	and	national	governments	are	
being	hobbled	in	their	capacity	to	address	them.	
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Existing	institutions	and	fora	of	global	governance	need	to	adjust	quickly	and	effectively	to	the	
dynamic	 and	evolving	 international	 system.	Leaders	dedicated	 to	 constructive	 changes	have	 to	
address	fundamental	questions:	What	are	the	new	realities	of	the	international	order?	Who	are	the	
agents	of	change?	How	can	national	governments	and	international	institutions	remain	relevant	in	
a	more	dynamic	and	interdependent	world?	To	address	these	issues,	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	and	
the	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	jointly	initiated	the	workshop	“Creative	Destruction:	Toward	an	Effective	
International	System.”	The	program	inaugurated	a	“Trilateral	Practitioners	Workshop”	in	Berlin	
on	July	7-8,	2011.	
The	gathering	brought	together	two	dozen	foreign	policy	practitioners	and	observers	from	Europe,	
the	United	States,	and	Asia	to	discuss	the	challenges	and	future	of	the	international	system	and	
the	 prospects	 for	 more	 effective	 forms	 of	 global	 governance.	 The	 workshop	 aimed	 to	 explore	
challenges,	identify	differences,	find	common	ground,	and	see	whether	participants	could	identify	
and	 agree	 on	 forces	 changing	 the	world,	 and	 outline	 a	 process	 that	would	 allow	narrowing	 of	
the	discourse,	reaching	conclusions	and	creating	an	action	plan.	Participants	represented	next-
generation	 leaders	 from	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 sectors	 including	 government,	 the	media,	 business,	
and	the	non-profit	community.	In	addition,	Mr.	Rodolfo	C.	Severino,	Head	of	the	ASEAN	Studies	
Centre	at	the	Institute	of	Southeast	Asian	Studies	in	Singapore	and	former	Secretary	General	of	
the	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations	(ASEAN),	Mr.	James	F.	Hoge,	Chairman,	Human	Rights	
Watch	and	former	Chair	at	the	Council	on	Foreign	Relations	and	editor	of	Foreign	Affairs,	Professor	
Dr.	Eberhard	Sandschneider,	Otto	Wolff-Director	of	the	Research	Institute	of	the	German	Council	
on	Foreign	Relations,	Mr.	Ralph	Cossa,	 President,	 Pacific	 Forum	CSIS,	 as	well	 as	Mr.	Andreas	
Esche,	Program	Director	with	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	joined	as	senior	experts.	
This	report	attempts	to	draw	tentative	conclusions	from	the	rich	discussion	in	Berlin.	The	paper	is	
not	a	summary	of	these	discussions.	Instead,	it	offers	a	subjective	reflection	on	the	international	
system	and	ways	 to	 address	 some	 of	 its	 shortcomings.	While	 our	 thinking	has	 been	 informed	
by	comments	and	written	reflections	of	workshop	participants,	 the	conclusions	are	ours	alone.	
Consequently,	we	are	solely	responsible	for	the	ideas	here,	as	well	as	for	any	mistakes	that	may	
have	slipped	through.
6 2 Key Findings
There	was	a	consensus	among	participants	that	effective	 forms	
of	global	governance	are	needed	more	than	ever	to	solve	global	
challenges	like	climate	change,	poverty,	food	insecurity,	nuclear	
proliferation,	 or	 economic	 crises.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	
there	 was	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 whether	 and	
how	 this	 could	 be	 accomplished,	 primarily	 because	 of	 a	 basic	
paradox:	 challenges	 are	 complex	 and	 interconnected	while	 the	
international	 system	 appears	 increasingly	 fragmented.	 The	
prevailing	notion	was	that	we	are	living	in	times	of	radical	uncertainty	in	international	affairs	and	
a	potentially	unstable	global	order	with	higher	risks	for	states	and	individual	citizens.	Despite	this	
sense	of	uncertainty,	the	following	key	findings	emerged	from	the	discussion:
2.1 Global Governance Is Not Working
There	is	a	strong	sense	that	the	system	of	global	governance	is	
not	working.	It	does	not	seem	representative	of	the	current	(and	
future)	distribution	of	wealth	and	power,	nor	is	there	confidence	
that	it	can	respond	to	major	global	challenges,	threats,	and	trends.	
This	sense	of	discomfort,	justified	or	not,	is	by	itself	dangerous,	
because	the	mere	belief	that	the	system	of	global	governance	is	
not	 working	 is	 contributing	 to	 the	 erosion	 of	 its	 effectiveness.	
A	 sense	 of	 foreboding	 about	 the	 future	 that	 defines	 opinion	 in	
many	parts	of	the	developed	world,	especially	in	the	West,	risks	
becoming	a	self-fulfilling	prophecy.
There	are	signs	that	this	process	is	already	underway.	The	failure	
of	 the	 2009	 Copenhagen	 climate	 summit	 is	 probably	 the	most	
prominent	 example.	 From	 a	 European	 perspective,	 the	 global	
summit	was	 not	 only	 disappointing	 –	 it	was	 a	 diplomatic	 disaster.	Although	Copenhagen	was	
a	 rare	case	of	 the	European	Union	showing	signs	of	global	 leadership	by	having	a	meaningful	
common	position,	 its	voice	was	muted	and	 its	representatives	marginalized	on	the	 final	day	of	
the	conference.	In	essence,	urgent	problems	were	displaced	and	
remain	unsolved.	Moreover,	the	Copenhagen	Summit	made	clear	
that	the	emerging	international	order	no	longer	revolves	around	
European	or	even	Western	priorities.	As	a	consequence,	European	
trust	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 international	 system	 to	 successfully	
cope	 with	 emergent	 and	 longstanding	 challenges	 diminished	
significantly.	A	European	participant	at	our	meeting	argued	this	
erosion	 of	 trust	 could	 be	 fatal:	 “The	 liberal	 order	 can	 survive	
marginalization	of	the	United	States,	but	not	the	marginalization	
of	Europe.	Europe	provides	 the	 ideas	 that	 form	 the	 core	 of	 the	
international	system.”
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7Similar	doubts	surround	the	global	free	trade	agenda	and	the	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO).	The	
Doha	Round	has	been	marking	time	for	almost	a	decade;	a	successful	conclusion	to	negotiations	is	
nowhere	in	sight.	This	deadlock	has	spurred	many	states	to	pursue	bilateral	trade	agreements	as	
well	as	broader	regional	arrangements,	anticipating	that	a	global	legally	binding	agreement	will	
not	be	adopted	any	time	soon	(or	ever).	This	fragmentation	is	suboptimal	in	terms	of	economic	
performance	and	even	undermines	global	negotiations	as	governments	devote	limited	time	and	
resources	to	other	priorities.	
Two	distinct	 criticisms	of	 the	 system	of	 global	 governance	emerged	 from	our	discussions.	 The	
first	 is	 a	 somewhat	prosaic	 criticism	 that	 the	 system	 is	not	working	because	 its	 structure	and	
procedures	have	not	kept	pace	with	a	rapidly	changing	world.	As	one	Asian	participant	argued,	
“international	 institutions	 are	 beset	 by	 scandals,	 lack	 effectiveness,	 cannot	 provide	 member	
countries	a	sense	of	security	and	the	like.	These	are	the	reasons	why	a	number	of	countries	go	for	
unilateral	actions.”	Another	Asian	speaker	agreed,	noting	that	smaller	countries	tend	to	focus	on	
the	UN	system	and	“it	has	failed	in	the	perspective	of	many	smaller	countries;	they	expect	it	to	do	
more.”	A	European	participant	differentiated	among	these	problems,	separating	those	that	leaders	
do	not	understand	from	those	they	lack	the	political	will	to	address.	
A	second	criticism	argues	that	the	problem	is	more	fundamental	
and	that	the	nature	of	the	international	order	itself	is	a	problem.	It	
is	not	who	is	in	charge,	but	the	fundamental	values	and	operating	
principles	of	the	system.	As	an	American	participant	explained,	
we	 are	 seeing	 “the	 emergence	 of	 alternative	 ideologies	 that	
threaten	 Western	 liberalism.”	 One	 US	 participant	 argued	 that	
the	claim	that	disputes	are	 really	 interest-based	misses	a	more	
fundamental	point:	questions	about	 the	distribution	of	goods	or	
power	ultimately	go	to	the	heart	of	how	the	system	works.	
Our	 participants	 characterized	 this	 split	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways:	
one	 called	 it	 a	 clash	 of	 values	 vs.	 a	 clash	 of	 interests.	Another	
suggested	we	distinguish	between	challenges	for	the	system	and	
challenges	to	the	system.	
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2.2 Incrementalism to the Rescue
Despite	 fears	 that	 the	 international	 system	 is	 not	 working,	 our	 group	 agreed	 that	 no	 radical	
alternative	is	conceivable	or	feasible.	There	are	too	many	vested	interests,	and	problems,	while	
evident,	 are	 slow	moving.	 There	 is	 no	 crisis	 on	 the	 horizon	 that	 can	 force	 action.	 Therefore,	
“creative	destruction”	is	not	an	option;	rather	gradual	reform	of	the	existing	system	is	the	goal.	A	
European	participant	agreed,	arguing	that,	“there	is	no	such	thing	as	new	global	governance.	We	
are	not	moving	from	one	system	to	another.	Rather,	there	is	a	continuity	of	global	governance.”	
The	challenge	then	is	to	identify	and	promote	innovative	approaches	to	global	governance.	Two	
possibilities	have	shown	promise	in	recent	years:	ad	hoc	institutional	arrangements	such	as	the	
G20	or	more	formal	regional	arrangements	such	as	the	European	Union	or	ASEAN.	
The	 G20	 is	 the	 most	 important	 recent	 innovation	 in	 global	
governance.	This	group	played	a	crucial	role	in	dealing	with	the	
immediate	challenges	posed	by	the	financial	and	economic	crisis.	
Indeed,	 the	 final	declaration	of	 the	September	2009	Pittsburgh	
G20	summit	declared	that	 it	would	become	“the	premier	forum	
for	 our	 international	 economic	 cooperation.”1	 It	 is	 tempting	 to	
conclude	that	its	initial	success	in	managing	this	crisis	resulted	
from	a	genuine	fear	among	G20	members	that	a	global	financial	
breakdown	was	a	very	 real	possibility;	 as	 soon	as	 the	 sense	of	
urgency	 abated,	 diverging	 interests	 reasserted	 themselves	 to	
dominate	 discussions	 and	 frustrate	 action.	 Real	 solutions	 to	
the	world’s	 financial	 problems	 remain	 beyond	 reach,	 and	 even	
the	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 new	 organization	 is	 being	 contested.	
Nevertheless,	creation	of	the	G20	has	signaled	that	the	international	system	is	trying	to	respond	to	
new	challenges	and	fix	urgent	problems	through	new	initiatives	based	on	a	changed	global	order.	
It	also	reinforced	the	perception	that	global	governance	is	in	essence	global	crisis	management;	
in	 other	words,	 that	 a	 coordinated	 and	 coherent	multilateral	 policy	 is	 only	possible	under	 the	
pressure	of	a	global	crisis	that	threatens	to	have	immediate	and	severe	impact	on	a	multitude	of	
domestic	populations.	
A	 second	 avenue	 for	 cooperation	 is	 regional	 institutions	 and	 arrangements.	 There	 is	much	 to	
commend	in	these	mechanisms.	They	are	closer	to	problems	they	are	trying	to	address,	with	a	
better	understanding	of	local	perspectives,	challenges,	resources,	and	dynamics.	They	can	fashion	
solutions	 that	 better	 fit	 local	 needs	 and	minimize	negative	 impacts.	Not	 surprisingly,	 they	 are	
often	seen	as	more	 legitimate	responses	and	can	command	more	respect	 from	individuals	and	
1	 Leaders’	 Statement	 The	Pittsburgh	 Summit,	 September	 24-25	 2009,	 p.	 3;	URL:		 http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
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9organizations	 affected	by	 their	 decisions.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	often	 lack	 resources	 and	 the	
“hard	power”	to	enforce	decisions.	The	lowest	common	denominator	approach	to	decision	making	
–	which	makes	decisions	more	legitimate	–	can	elevate	national	or	regional	perspectives	above	
the	“norms”	they	are	ostensibly	trying	to	support.	In	short,	there	can	be	(and	often	is)	a	tension	
between	regional	and	global	imperatives.	
The	 growth	 of	 economic,	 environmental,	 and	 security	 inter-
dependence	is	creating	a	demand	for	a	rules-based	international	
system	 that	 fosters	 multilateral	 cooperation	 and	 institutions.	
Yet	international	institutions,	in	many	cases,	are	mutating	from	
organizations	focused	on	solving	problems	into	arenas	for	waging	
conflict	as	newly	empowered	states	assert	their	particular	national	
interests.	Despite	a	growing	sense	of	interdependence,	there	is	a	
lack	of	faith	in	the	ability	of	the	system	to	protect	those	interests,	
either	because	the	institutions	of	governance	are	weak	or	because	
they	are	constitutionally	flawed.	
As	 a	 guiding	 principle,	 an	 effective	 international	 system	 must	 be	 capable	 of	 resolving	 (and	
preferably	preventing)	conflict	among	states.	This	requisite	is	always	important,	but	it	seems	to	be	
increasing	in	significance	in	a	world	of	more	assertive	states	with	divergent	interests.	At	present,	
there	appear	to	be	two	competing	perspectives	on	how	to	achieve	that	objective.	The	first	is	the	
“ASEAN	way”	of	soft	institutions	and	inclusive,	non-coercive	collaboration.	A	variant	on	this	theme	
is	China’s	proclaimed	concept	of	international	relations	–	“harmony.”	This	provides	member	states	
with	space	to	assert	their	own	interests	and	makes	national	sovereignty	an	irreducible	minimum.	
It	 draws	 upon	 a	 19th-century	model	 of	 statehood	 –	 ironically,	 a	 European	model	 –	 that	 holds	
national	borders	inviolable	and	seems	quaint	(if	not	outdated)	given	21st-century	communications	
technologies	 and	 capabilities.	 The	 second	 option	 is	 the	 (more	 recent)	 European	 experience	 of	
mitigating	conflicts	through	political	integration	and	rule-based	procedures.	This	requires	member	
states	to	voluntarily	relinquish	part	of	their	sovereignty	and	delegate	it	to	supranational	intuitions.	
Most	(if	not	all)	emerging	countries	are	unwilling	to	do	so.	And	indeed,	the	European	experience	
may	not	be	a	model	as	there	are	rising	questions	about	how	much	sovereignty	European	countries	
are	themselves	willing	to	give	up,	particularly	in	the	wake	of	the	Eurozone’s	sovereign	debt	crisis.	
Their	 flaws	 notwithstanding,	 these	 two	 options	 outline	 directions	 in	 which	 the	 international	
system	can	evolve.	
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2.3 Regional Perspectives
Western	concerns	about	the	future	of	the	international	system	emanate	from	the	“rise	of	the	rest.”2	
The	rise	of	East	Asia	and	India	and	a	rebalancing	of	global	governance	–	with	more	power	flowing	
to	Asia	–	have	created	anxiety	in	the	West	about	the	future	of	that	system.	There	are	fears	that	“the	
rise	of	the	rest”	will	result	in	new	global	norms,	new	operating	principles	for	global	institutions,	
and	different	outcomes	in	international	decision-making	that,	even	if	“fair,”	will	disadvantage	the	
current	holders	of	power	and	privilege.
There	is	a	sense	–	indeed	a	belief	–	that	China,	in	particular,	is	
(or	will	soon	be)	challenging	 international	norms.	China	 insists	
that	is	not	true,	but	those	assertions	are	not	believed.	As	a	result,	
mistrust	and	suspicion	permeate	China’s	 relations	with	 the	US	
and	many	other	states,	 including	the	European	Union	and	even	
some	 of	 China’s	 neighbors.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 idea	
of	 a	 world	 order	 dominated	 by	 a	 G2,	 i.e.,	 an	 informal	 rather	
than	 formal	 joint	 US-Chinese	 leadership	 in	 global	 affairs,	 was	
dismissed	as	unrealistic	by	all.	At	 the	 same	 time,	however,	 the	
development	of	US-China	relations,	was	widely	considered	a	 (if	
not	the)	determinant	of	how	the	international	system	will	evolve.
The	 rise	 of	China	 to	 the	 status	 of	 a	 global	 power	 is	 one	 of	 the	
most	 significant	 events	 of	 the	 early	 21st	 century.	 There	 are,	
however,	striking	differences	 in	how	this	 rise	 is	perceived.	Many	people	 in	 the	US	continue	 to	
see	 the	world	 in	 realist	 terms	 and	 assume	 that	China’s	 economic	 rise	will	make	 it	 a	 regional	
and	global	military	power	that	challenges	vital	American	strategic	and	security	interests.	Those	
strategists	see	“hegemonic	ambitions”	in	almost	any	action	that	Beijing	takes	and	demand	moves	
to	counter	that	plan.	In	recent	months,	Chinese	behavior	to	deal	with	territorial	disputes	in	the	
South	and	East	China	Seas	seems	to	confirm	these	suspicions.3	While	this	 is	a	simplified	view	
of	a	(sometimes)	more	nuanced	and	sophisticated	assessment	of	state	trajectories,	this	thinking	
appears	 to	 be	 based	 upon	 notions	 of	 geostrategic	 interests	 and	 great	 power	 rivalries	 deriving	
from	the	19th	and	20th	centuries.	 It	 treats	 international	 relations	as	a	zero-sum	game	 in	which	
one	participant’s	gains	are	balanced	by	the	losses	of	another.	Applying	this	framework	to	China’s	
rise	reinforces	the	notion	that	it	is	tantamount	to	a	decline	of	the	US	and	Europe.	Since	the	US	
has	been	a	primary	architect	and	‘supporter‘	of	the	international	order,	China’s	rise	is	perceived	
not	just	as	a	challenge	to	the	status	quo	but	as	a	threat	to	the	system	itself.4	Some	uncertainty	
about	Chinese	intentions	is	understandable.	One	Chinese	participant	–	like	many	other	Chinese	
2	 Fareed	Zakaria,	The	Future	of	American	Power.	How	America	Can	Survive	the	Rise	of	the	Rest,	in:	Foreign	Affairs,	Vol.	82,	No.	
3,	May/June	2008,	pp.	18-43.
3	 Of	course,	US	views	of	China	are	not	monolithic.	And	US	policy,	while	‘hedging’	against	the	possibility	of	conflict	with	China,	
is	to	engage	Beijing	and	work	with	it	to	solve	regional	and	global	problems.	
4	 This	view	is	not	without	precedent.	As	one	of	our	Asian	participants	pointed	out,	there	is	a	parallel	between	China	today	and	
Japan	back	in	the	1980s.
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scholars	and	professionals	who	work	in	these	fields	–	insisted	that	China	understands	the	stresses	
created	by	its	rise,	 that	 its	 leaders	have	studied	history	and	appreciate	the	tensions	created	by	
rising	 powers,	 and	 argued	 that	 China	 has	 benefited	 from	 the	 existing	 international	 order	 and	
needs	peace	and	stability	to	continue	to	rise.	At	the	same	time,	however,	there	is	an	unmistakable	
sense	of	disenfranchisement	flowing	from	criticism	of	the	rules	of	the	existing	international	order	
when	Chinese	prerogatives	are	challenged.	The	call	for	a	more	democratic	international	system	
that	is	based	on	“the	five	principles	of	peaceful	coexistence”	suggests	a	demand	for	new	operating	
principles	in	international	relations.	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	US,	Europe	–	 the	EU	as	well	 as	 its	member	 states	–	has	 fewer	 geostrategic	
and	 security	 concerns	 in	 Asia.	 After	 the	withdrawal	 of	 colonial	 powers	 from	Asia	 after	 1945,	
Europe	has	re-engaged	Asian	countries	in	an	effort	to	strengthen	economic	and	cultural	ties.	Some	
Europeans	applaud	the	rise	of	China	as	a	counterbalance	to	US	dominance;	some,	including	some	
of	 our	most	 vocal	 participants,	 insist	 that	 the	 rise	 of	Asia	 should	give	 renewed	vigor	 to	 trans-
Atlantic	relations	to	gird	an	international	system	that	is	under	threat.	Moreover,	Europeans	do	not	
have	the	same	security	ties	to	Asia	as	do	Americans	(whose	alliances	with	Asian	partners	are	for	
many	the	foundation	of	regional	security	and	stability).	The	US	would	be	directly	involved	in	any	
instability,	crisis,	or	conflict	and	is	therefore	more	sensitive	to	the	impact	of	changes	in	the	status	
quo.	Europe’s	distance	affords	it	a	more	benign	perspective	and	it	is	less	inclined	to	see	regional	
change	in	Asia	as	destabilizing.5	
Asian	perspectives	embrace	elements	of	both	US	and	European	views	of	the	international	system.	
Again	generalizations	are	difficult,	since	Asia	is	too	large	and	diverse	to	have	a	single	perspective.	
Pick	 a	 dimension	 –	 size	 of	 state,	 population,	 GDP,	 GDP	 per	 capita,	 type	 of	 government,	 type	
of	 economy,	 religion,	 etc	–	and	 there	 is	 an	Asian	nation	on	every	point	on	 the	spectrum.	And	
when	non-Asians	mention	“the	rise	of	Asia,”	Asian	speakers	insist	that	there	is	no	single	Asian	
perspective.	Indeed,	the	rise	of	Asian	countries	and	the	rise	of	China	are	often	used	synonymously	
but	should	not	be.	The	idea	that	a	tripolar	global	order	is	emerging	is	based	on	the	creation	of	an	
Asian	pole	that	is	much	more	than	just	China.	Southeast	Asia	has	some	560	million	inhabitants,	
a	“community”	larger	than	that	of	Europe.	Its	economic	development	long	predates	that	of	China:	
Japan	 ‘rose’	 in	 the	 ‘60s	 and	 ‘70s,	 the	 Asian	 Tigers	 (Hong	 Kong,	 Singapore,	 South	 Korea	 and	
Taiwan)	 followed,	which	were	 in	 turn	 chased	by	 the	 “Tiger	Cub”	 economies	 in	Southeast	Asia	
(Indonesia,	Malaysia,	Philippines,	and	Thailand).	China’s	rise	is	only	the	most	recent	phenomenon	
and	it	 is	being	followed	by	growth	in	Vietnam	and	India.	It	 is	the	broad-based	nature	of	Asia’s	
growth	and	its	potential	for	internally	sustainable	dynamism	that	distinguishes	this	moment	from	
its	predecessors.	
5	 Here	too	it	must	be	noted	that	European	views	of	China	are	not	monolithic	and	there	are	hawks	on	the	continent	who	can	go	
toe	to	toe	with	their	US	counterparts	when	it	comes	to	suspicion	of	Chinese	motives.
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This	has	two	contradictory	implications.	The	first	is	that	discussions	of	global	governance	have	to	
move	beyond	a	facile	and	simplistic	focus	on	China;	China	is	part	of	a	bigger	story.	No	country,	
no	matter	how	big,	can	undo	 the	entire	 international	system	on	 its	own;	 it	must	have	allies	or	
similarly	inclined	diplomatic	partners.	Asian	intellectuals	have	suggested	that	such	a	mass	exists.	
Concepts	 and	visions	 of	 “Asia”	 as	 an	 entity	 or	 a	 shared	 “Asian	 identity”	have	 a	 long	 tradition	
both	within	and	outside	the	region.	The	last	decade	witnessed	discussions	of	“Asian	values”	and	
“Asian	capitalism.”	Current	debates	about	the	role	of	China	and	India	as	emerging	global	powers	
substantiated	claims	of	the	21st	century	as	an	“Asian	century.”	
Yet,	the	very	term	“Asia”	is	imprecise.	Its	meaning	depends	on	context	and	who	is	using	the	term.	
Its	geographic	boundaries	are	uncertain,	and	thus	its	referents	are	unclear.	Moreover,	the	duality	
of	modern	life,	with	its	penetration	of	capitalist	goods	–	many	of	which,	while	made	in	Asia,	have	
Western	origins	–	contributes	to	a	sense	of	confusion.	Western	goods,	values,	and	culture	penetrate	
Asian	societies	effortlessly	and	countries	and	citizens	must	balance	their	worth	with	indigenous	
values	and	goods.	As	one	Asian	participant	bemoaned,	“Asians	can’t	tell	their	position	in	relation	
to	the	liberal	order.”	(In	this	report,	we	use	“Asia”	primarily	to	refer	to	East	Asia	(meaning	the	
ASEAN	Plus	Three)	without	disregarding	the	great	diversity	of	this	region.)
When	referring	to	the	anxieties	in	the	Western	world	caused	by	
the	 “rise	 of	 Asia,”	 in	 our	 view,	 this	 distinction	 does	 not	 really	
matter,	because	these	fears	are	as	 imprecise	and	elusive	as	the	
term	 “Asia.”	 Indeed,	 a	 clear-eyed	 assessment	 of	 the	 anxiety	
triggered	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 Asia	would	 note	 that	 “the	 problem”	 is	
not	 just	 the	 rise	of	China	but	 the	prospect	of	 a	world	 in	which	
Western	dominance	has	ended.	It	is	“the	rise	of	the	rest”	and	the	
resulting	 loss	 of	Western	 privilege	 that	 generates	 anxiousness.	
(Nonetheless,	 our	 discussion	 did	 not	 include	 participants	 from	
emerging	powers	that	are	not	in	Asia,	Europe,	or	North	America.)
Asians	themselves	are	divided	about	China.	They	understand	the	
geographic	reality	of	the	Chinese	state;	unlike	the	US,	it	is	physically	
situated	 in	 the	 region	 and	 cannot	 withdraw.	 They	 seek	 to	 exploit	 the	 economic	 opportunities	
afforded	by	Chinese	growth	and	see	it	is	a	critical	trade	and	investment	partner.	At	the	same	time,	
they	worry	about	China’s	long-term	intentions	and	fear	that	it	may	become	a	hegemonic	power	in	
the	region.	They	are	equally	concerned	about	uncontrolled	rivalry	or	confrontation	between	the	US	
and	China	that	would	force	them	to	take	sides.	They	prefer	a	good	relationship	between	the	US	and	
China,	as	long	as	it	is	not	“too	friendly”;	a	G2	is	as	worrisome	to	them	as	a	world	in	which	they	are	in	
conflict.	Chinese	participants	insisted	that	all	fears	are	unfounded,	arguing	that	their	country	needs	
a	stable	regional	environment	so	that	it	can	improve	living	standards	and	that	Beijing	has	domestic	
problems	of	its	own	and	has	no	pretension	to	a	G2	system	that	formally	or	informally	shares	power	
with	the	US.	Thus,	it	is	in	China’s	interest	to	contribute	to	and	help	maintain	a	peaceful	and	stable	
(“harmonious”)	international	environment.	
A clear-eyed assessment 
of the anxiety triggered by 
the rise of Asia would note 
that “the problem” is not 
just the rise of China but 
the prospect of a world in 
which Western dominance 
has ended. It is “the rise of 
the rest” and the resulting 
loss of Western privilege 
that generates anxiousness.
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There	 is	 no	mistaking	Chinese	 dissatisfactions	with	 the	 existing	 system	 of	 global	 governance,	
however;	our	participants	were	quick	 to	point	out	 its	 flaws.	And	even	 if	China’s	 top	priority	 is	
domestic	stability,	there	are	many	ways	that	a	government	focused	on	such	concerns	can	threaten	
the	international	system:	 it	can	deflect	 the	anger	of	a	dissatisfied	citizenry	onto	outside	forces,	
blaming	them	for	setbacks	or	domestic	problems.	More	concretely,	the	desire	to	promote	growth	
has	produced	trade	and	currency	policies	that	have	been	labeled	‘mercantilist’	or	‘predatory.’	
The	distinction	between	China’s	rise	and	that	of	Asia	as	a	whole	matters	in	other	ways.	Looking	
at	all	of	Asia	dilutes	China’s	role	and	status;	it	is	merely	one	–	albeit	big	–	country	among	13.	A	
regional	construct	 limits	China’s	 freedom	of	maneuver	and	capacity	to	 influence	the	system.	A	
similar	logic	can	be	applied	to	the	US;	for	all	the	complaints	of	US	unilateralism	in	recent	years,	
Washington	has	been	and	continues	to	be	restrained	by	alliances	in	Asia	and	Europe	as	well	as	by	
the	international	institutional	order	it	helped	create	after	World	War	II.	Smaller	powers	have	an	
important	role	to	play,	constraining	partners,	supporting	norms,	and	providing	the	numbers	that	
create	majorities	in	institutions.	(This	cuts	two	ways:	smaller	nations	can	act	as	a	bulwark	for	the	
existing	 international	order,	 restraining	revanchist	states,	or	 they	can	band	with	 revisionists	 to	
demand	change.)	ASEAN	is	a	perfect	example	of	the	smaller	nations	of	Southeast	Asia	engaging	
and	circumscribing	the	diplomacy	of	the	larger	states	of	Northeast	Asia.	They	can	also	bring	issues	
to	the	attention	of	larger	nations	(as	they	have	with	the	South	China	Sea).	Nor	should	it	be	forgotten	
that	emerging	middle	powers	such	as	Indonesia,	are	becoming	more	confident	playing	a	role	in	
regional	and	global	governance.	However,	while	insisting	on	more	input	in	such	matters,	our	Asian	
participants	were	skeptical	that	such	changes	would	alter	“the	way	the	world	works.”	Moreover,	
they	conceded	that	many	of	the	most	pressing	problems	are	too	complex	for	them	to	tackle.	Their	
role	in	a	new	world	order,	however	it	is	structured,	will	of	necessity	be	limited.	
In	 the	West,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 that	 rising	 powers	 are	 not	 being	
held	 accountable	 nor	 are	 they	 ready	 to	 take	 responsibility	 for	
global	governance.	Once	again,	China	is	at	the	forefront	of	those	
criticized,	 although	 other	 countries	 are	 blamed	 as	well.	 At	 the	
core	of	this	criticism	is	the	free	rider	problem:	rising	powers	are	
blamed	for	taking	advantage	of	the	international	system,	playing	
an	increasingly	important	role	within	it,	but	are	unwilling	to	share	
the	burdens	of	global	governance.	They	often	seek	bilateral	deals	
instead	 of	 trying	 to	 strengthen	 institutional	 capacity	 or	 playing	
by	 the	 rules	 of	 international	 institutions.	 In	 this	 view,	 the	 key	
issue	 is	how	emerging	powers	can	be	 induced	 to	 take	on	more	
responsibilities	in	global	governance.	Regardless	of	the	validity	of	
allegations	of	free	riding,	they	have	deepened	Western	anxieties	
about	the	“Asian”	challenge	to	the	global	order.	
In the West, there is a 
sense that rising powers 
are not being held 
accountable nor are they 
ready to take responsibility 
for global governance  … 
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Part	of	the	problem	is	the	understanding	of	the	international	system,	especially	when	it	is	defined	
as	a	“liberal	world	order.”	For	many	of	our	participants,	this	is	a	“Western”	characterization,	which	
raises	 several	problems.	First,	 if	 this	 is	 indeed	a	 ‘Western”	description,	 then	 it	 is	 implied	 that	
Asia’s	rise	will	change	the	order	 to	better	reflect	 its	new	makeup	and	character.	Second,	 there	
are	questions	whether	Asians	are	“accepted”	in	this	“Western	order.”	In	other	words,	regardless	
of	intent,	there	is	a	suspicion	–	sometimes	grounded	in	fact	–	that	Asian	nations	are	not	afforded	
equal	status	when	they	get	a	seat	at	the	table.	
Third,	there	are	questions	about	what	this	order	is	–	what	values	are	present,	what	institutions	are	its	
backbone,	and	how	it	should	operate.	At	the	most	fundamental	level,	there	are	at	least	two	different	
notions	or	definitions:	The	first	is	the	traditional	Westphalian	order	based	on	the	principle	of	state	
sovereignty	 and	nonintervention.	The	 second,	more	 recent	 idea	 of	 a	 “liberal	world	 order”	gives	
much	greater	sway	to	individual	human	rights,	institutionalized	multilateral	cooperation	and	the	
rule	of	law.	This	notion	originated	after	World	War	II	and	was	inspired	by	the	European	experience	
of	political	integration	and	pooling	of	sovereignty	to	deal	with	common	problems.	More	recently,	
proponents	of	 this	notion	have	sought	 to	 legitimize	armed	humanitarian	 intervention	under	 the	
concept	of	“the	responsibility	to	protect”,	thus	weakening	the	norm	of	sovereignty	by	making	it	
conditional	on	states’	conduct	and	protection	of	human	rights.	While	Asian	states,	including	China,	
have	 less	difficulties	subscribing	 to	 the	 first,	more	 traditional	Westphalian	notion,	 they	strongly	
reject	the	second,	which	is	believed	to	reflect	a	Western	agenda.	They	demand	that	norms	better	
reflect	their	cultures	and	histories.	This	is	not	a	rejection	of	some	of	those	norms	–	human	rights,	for	
example	–	but	their	redefinition	and	conceptualization	to	reflect	different	circumstances.	Without	
meaning	to	put	a	thumb	on	the	scale,	there	can	be	a	debate	about	the	rightful	balance	between	
political	and	economic	rights	or	freedom	of	speech	and	the	need	for	social	order.	
While	the	state	has	served	as	the	essential	unit	of	international	
order,	one	of	our	European	participants	argued	that	globalization	
challenges	traditional	concepts	of	sovereignty.	State	borders	are	
being	 rendered	porous,	making	notions	of	absolute	state	power	
increasingly	 unrealistic.	 That	 process	 is	 complemented	 and	
accelerated	by	technologies	that	enable	and	empower	new	actors.	
New	 challenges	 and	 threats	 demand	 new	 forms	 of	 cooperation	
that	undercut	sovereignty	as	well.	Many	emerging	powers	in	Asia,	
however,	are	relatively	new	states	(and	in	most	cases	former	Western	colonies)	with	a	strong	sense	
of	sovereignty.	This	is	a	natural	outgrowth	of	the	state-building	project.	They	have	little	interest	
in	 giving	 up	 some	 national	 sovereignty	 for	 collective	 security	 or	 contributing	 to	 global	 public	
goods.	This	attitude	is	a	powerful	obstacle	to	efforts	to	promote	and	actively	strengthen	regional	
integration	and	global	governance.	As	one	of	our	Asian	participants	conceded,	“the	EU	model	is	
great,	but	Asia	is	not	yet	there,	though	modernity	is	definitely	pushing	Asia	in	that	direction.”	In	
other	words,	sovereignty	is	a	key	issue	for	any	reform	of	the	international	system	and	effective	
global	governance	may	be	impossible	without	modifications	of	it.
Sovereignty is a key issue 
for any reform of the 
international system and 
effective global governance 
may be impossible without 
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In	 addition	 to	 divergent	 attitudes	 toward	 sovereignty,	 European	
anxieties	 about	 the	 “rise	 of	 Asia”	 are	 fueled	 by	 the	 fear	 that	
Europe’s	 role	 in	 the	 international	 system	 is	 as	 contested	as	 that	
of	 Asia.	 The	 shift	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 from	 the	 Atlantic	 to	
the	Pacific	Ocean	seems	 to	come	at	Europe’s	expense.	Although	
the	 institutional	 provisions	 in	 the	 Lisbon	 treaty	 to	 strengthen	
EU	 foreign	 policy	 are	 ambitious,	 Europe’s	 future	 role	 in	 global	
governance	 is	 in	 question.	 The	 Eurozone’s	 sovereign	 debt	 crisis	
and	the	lack	of	political	leadership	in	addressing	its	core	problems	
are	nurturing	perceptions	of	decline	within	and	outside	Europe.	As	
a	result,	the	EU	and	its	member	states	have	lost	credibility	in	terms	
of	coherence	and	efficiency	in	policy	making	and	they	are,	in	the	
words	of	one	participant,	“disappearing	as	reference	points	of	global	governance.”	Europeans	agree	
that	the	EU	is	underperforming	as	a	global	actor,	although	it	has	the	capacity	and	resources	to	play	a	
strong	and	influential	role	on	the	global	stage,	specifically	in	the	sector	of	technology,	environmental	
protection,	and	social	development.	They	are,	however,	divided	over	whether	the	EU	and	its	member	
states	can	mobilize	the	political	will	and	leadership	that	is	necessary	to	overcome	internal	divisions	
and	to	play	such	a	role.	While	pessimists	point	to	growing	economic	problems	of	the	Eurozone	and	
the	related	resurgence	of	nationalism	in	many	European	countries,	which	threaten	the	coherence	
and	even	the	existence	of	the	EU,	optimists	argue	that	European	integration	has	always	advanced	
through	crises.	In	their	view,	the	current	sovereign	debt	crisis	is	no	exception,	and	will	serve	as	a	
catalyst	for	deeper	political	integration	that	in	the	long	run	will	allow	Europe	to	upgrade	its	role	as	
a	global	actor.	
There	are	fundamental	questions	about	the	value	and	prospects	for	greater	integration	that	follows	
the	classic	European	model.	We	had	little	discussion	of	the	value	of	regionalism	and	its	relationship	
to	global	governance.	There	is	little	understanding	of	how	regional	and	global	institutions	interact.	
Regional	governance	could	become	a	building	block	of	global	governance.	There	is,	for	example,	
an	increasing	convergence	of	norms	among	China	and	ASEAN.	ASEAN	has	pressed	its	partner	
countries	to	sign	the	Treaty	of	Amity	and	Cooperation	(TAC)	as	a	condition	for	joining	the	East	
Asia	Summit;	 its	key	 interlocutors	have	done	so,	helping	promote	TAC’s	core	value	of	peaceful	
resolution	of	disputes.	Moreover,	ASEAN	has	been	instrumental	in	pushing	China	to	adopt	a	Code	
of	Conduct	for	the	South	China	Sea;	that	has	been	a	slow-moving	process	but	 it	has	picked	up	
momentum	in	recent	months.	All	these	developments	are	in	their	early	stages	and	it	is	too	early	
to	tell	what	impact	they	will	have	on	global	governance.	There	is	hope,	however,	that	they	can	play	
a	larger	and	more	significant	role,	at	least	in	certain	areas.	An	Asian	participant	underscored	how	
regional	institutions	play	a	larger	socialization	role,	pointing	out	that	“China’s	close	interaction	
with	ASEAN	 is	not	 just	about	convergence	of	norms,	but	 the	 fact	 that	ASEAN	 is	an	 important	
forum	for	China,	Japan	and	South	Korea	to	engage	each	other.”	
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Our	discussion	concluded	that	major	innovations	within	the	international	system	are	unlikely	in	
the	short	term.	Blame	established	and	emerging	powers	that	have	an	interest	in	preserving	the	
status	quo	and	the	fact	that	emerging	regional	institutions	are	too	weak	to	change	the	way	the	
international	system	works.	If	so,	who	will	be	agents	of	change?
2.4 Agents of Change
As	 international	 relations	 become	 more	 diverse	 and	 complex,	
power	is	not	only	shifting	from	established	to	emerging	countries,	
but	 also	 toward	 individuals	 and	 non-state	 actors.	 Modern	
information	 and	 communication	 technologies	 have	 empowered	
individuals	and	social	groups	 to	an	unprecedented	degree.	The	
internet	and	social	media	have	extended	the	reach	and	influence	of	
individuals	and	organizations	and	enabled	them	to	directly	engage	
in	international	affairs.	Yet,	while	relations	between	the	state	and	
the	 individual	 are	 being	 rebalanced	by	 information	 technology,	
the	state	 remains	 the	central	 actor	 in	 the	 international	 system.	
While	states	may	not	be	as	effective	in	implementing	change	as	
in	 the	 past,	 they	 are	 extremely	 effective	 in	 blocking	 reform	 or	
adaptation.	Thus,	the	key	to	affecting	change	is	identifying	ways	
to	move	states	(or	their	organs)	to	implement	change.	
Plainly,	more	must	be	done	to	figure	out	how	to	utilize	non-state	
actors	 as	 agents	 of	 positive	 change.	 The	 growing	 importance	
and	 impact	 of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 international	 politics	 is	 one	
distinctive	 political	 development.	 Transnational	 nongovernmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 civil	
society	 groups,	 social	 entrepreneurs,	 faith-based	 organizations,	multinational	 corporations	 and	
other	business	bodies,	as	well	as	trans-sectoral	public	policy	networks	are	increasingly	effective	
in	 framing	 issues,	setting	agendas,	and	mobilizing	public	opinion.	At	 the	same	time,	non-state	
actors	such	as	criminal	organizations	and	terrorist	networks,	also	empowered	by	new	information	
and	communication	technologies,	pose	serious	threats	to	the	international	system.	Although	non-
state	actors	usually	have	no	formal	decision–making	power	and	do	not	necessarily	alter	the	policy-
making	process,	their	impact	on	world	politics	is	significant	and	likely	to	grow.	Take	your	pick	–	
as	did	one	US	participant	–	“Bill	Gates.	vs.	Bin	Laden.	An	individual	can	have	a	huge	influence	in	
an	interconnected	world.”	(Of	course,	that	influence	can	be	limited;	another	US	participated	was	
quick	to	note	that	“non-state	actors	don’t	necessarily	alter	the	policy-making	process.	Wikileaks	
didn’t	crack	the	US	system	and	it	only	played	a	minor	role	in	the	Arab	Spring.”	Crudely	put,	power	
still	matters.)
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17
Relations	between	states	and	non-state	actors	are	not	a	zero-sum	game.	The	key	question,	therefore	
is,	how	can	they	work	together?	The	increased	participation	of	transnationally	engaged	NGOs	and	
other	 civil	 society	organizations	 (CSOs)	 in	 international	politics	provides	examples	of	 effective	
collaboration	 with	 national	 governments	 and	 intergovernmental	 institutions.	 This	 is	 a	 mutual	
process:	 a	 strong	 international	 system	 reinforces	 the	 actions	 of	NGOs	and	 similar	groups.	 The	
growing	number	and	proliferation	of	CSOs	and	social	entrepreneurs	 in	the	 international	policy	
arena	 reflects	 the	 steady	 increase	 in	 resources	 from	 governments,	 international	 institutions,	
corporations,	 and	 foundations,	 accompanied	 by	 greater	 reliance	 by	 state-based	 actors	 on	 the	
outsourcing	of	public	services.	Newly	empowered,	CSOs	fill	roles	in	global	governance	that	can	be	
broadly	separated	into	categories	of	advocacy	and	operations	but	that	more	specifically	include	
work	in	agenda-setting,	negotiation	of	norms	and	agreements,	 implementation	and	monitoring,	
and	reaction	to	non-compliance.	As	a	participant	from	civil	society	noted,	state	and	non-state	actors	
have	a	mutual	relationship,	working	together	to	achieve	shared	goals.	Ideally,	non-state	actors	help	
governments	tackle	difficult	problems.	
In	the	absence	of	an	overarching	approach	to	global	governance,	collaborative	efforts	among	states	
and	CSOs	will	increasingly	provide	the	framework	for	addressing	challenges	of	a	globalized	world.	
However,	despite	 their	growing	 importance,	civil	 society	 is	not	a	silver	bullet	because	national	
governments	and	international	institutions	continue	to	be	more	powerful	in	many	respects	–	and	
in	some	cases	are	opposed	to	actions	of	civil	society.	After	all,	one	of	the	goals	of	these	non-state	
efforts	is	to	help	or	empower	the	disenfranchised	or	ignored;	thus,	they	implicitly	challenge	the	
structure	of	power.
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Moreover,	civil	society	is	not	monolithic,	but	a	pluralist	universe	
of	 values,	 opinions,	 and	 interests	 ranging	 across	 the	 political	
spectrum.	 All	 too	 often,	 this	 universe	 resembles	 the	 Tower	 of	
Babel,	displaying	a	high	degree	of	 fragmentation	that	 limits	 its	
effectiveness	 and	undermines	 its	 legitimacy.	 In	 addition,	CSOs	
are	 not	 exclusively	 norm-driven	 actors	 but	 organizations	 that	
pursue	 self-interested	 strategies	 to	 ensure	 their	 institutional	
survival,	 often	 competing	 with	 each	 other	 for	 influence	 and	
funding.	In	other	words:	lines	of	conflict	among	actors	of	global	
civil	society	are	multiple	and	shifting.	Given	this	diversity	and	
political	 fragmentation,	 the	 only	 thing	 that	 can	 be	 stated	with	
certainty	is	that	CSOs	contribute	to	the	pluralization	of	global	governance.	They	foster	pluralism	
on	the	global	level	as	they	do	on	the	local,	regional,	and	national	level	by	enabling	multiple	values,	
perspectives,	and	interests	to	be	represented,	different	functions	to	be	performed,	and	a	range	of	
capacities	to	be	developed.	
Thus,	 a	 central	 issue	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 agents	 of	 change	 is	 leadership.	 Any	 government,	
international	 institution	or	 individual	political	 leader	willing	and	capable	of	exercising	genuine	
leadership	 could	 be	 an	 agent	 of	 change.	 Hence,	 it	 was	 no	 surprise	 that	 there	 was	 an	 almost	
unanimous	agreement	among	workshop	participants	on	the	necessity	for	a	new	kind	of	leadership	
to	 foster	a	more	effective	 international	system	–	 leadership	 that	can	address	global	 issues	and	
engage	the	necessary	stakeholders	long	enough	to	produce	sustainable	solutions.	Yet	there	was	
no	 agreement	 on	how	 to	 define	 leadership,	 how	 to	 promote	 it,	 and	how	 to	 distinguish	 it	 from	
power.	Consequently,	there	was	no	consensus	on	how	to	overcome	the	alleged	lack	of	leadership	
in	 international	 affairs.	 The	 fundamental	 problem	 is	 that	 leaders	 are	 accountable	 to	 domestic	
constituencies.	Yet	the	solution	of	international	problems	requires	power,	authority,	and	influence	
beyond	national	borders.	How	do	 leaders	engage	 individuals	when	their	authority	 is	so	clearly	
defined?	 On	what	 basis	 do	 they	 rally	 forces	 to	 tackle	 those	 pressing	 problems?	 How	 do	 they	
convince	other	leaders	to	make	sacrifices	for	the	public	good?	There	need	to	be	incentives	and	
accountability	structures	that	reward	political	leaders	who	act	in	support	of	global	public	goods;	
without	them,	global	governance	will	fail.	
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In	some	cases,	 leadership	 is	 its	own	punishment.	Sticking	one’s	head	above	the	parapet	 (so	 to	
speak),	invites	criticism	and	condemnation.	Governments	can	be	forced	to	bear	costs	they	might	
not	otherwise	have	to	for	merely	being	audacious	enough	to	attempt	to	solve	a	problem.	One	Asian	
participant	suggested	that	here	the	ASEAN	example	could	help	since	“the	key	to	ASEAN’s	success	
is	that	it	leads	without	appearing	as	a	leader.”
This	 raises	 the	 issue	 of	 US	 leadership.	 As	 long	 as	 emerging	
powers	 are	 not	 willing	 and	 Europe	 is	 not	 able	 to	 provide	
leadership	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 the	 US	 remains	 the	 only	
candidate,	notwithstanding	the	many	challenges	it	faces.	Yet,	its	
shrinking	 resources	 and	 domestic	 constraints	 have	 forced	 the	
US	to	rethink	its	traditional	leadership	role	–	or	as	some	critics	
charge,	to	retrench	or	abandon	that	role	altogether.	However,	there	
is	as	yet	no	substitute	for	US	leadership.	While	the	group	did	not	
address	in-depth	the	US	role	in	the	international	system	and	the	
implications	of	diminished	US	international	activism	(nor	did	it	tackle	the	question	whether	that	
was	desirable),	US	participants	argued	that	the	US	should	try	to	lead	by	the	power	of	example,	
not	by	the	example	of	power.	The	only	conclusion	from	the	discussions	was	that	in	the	absence	
of	proactive	political	leadership	on	an	international	scale,	in	all	likelihood,	crises	will	continue	to	
serve	as	the	catalyst	for	change	in	global	governance.
In the absence of proactive 
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There	is	a	growing	sense	that	the	system	of	global	governance	is	
not	entirely	suited	 to	 the	21st	century.	Existing	 institutions	and	
mechanisms	 cannot	 solve	 the	 world’s	 most	 urgent	 challenges.	
That	should	not	be	surprising	since	many	of	these	problems	are	
of	a	size	and	scale	never	before	experienced.	As	one	participant	
explained,	“the	management	of	global	planetary	problems	is	of	a	
different	nature	and	dimension	than	the	problems	of	 the	past.”	
Recent	 attempts	 by	 the	 international	 community	 to	 address	
problems	like	climate	change,	environmental	pollution,	financial	
regulatory	reform,	trade	policy,	nuclear	non-proliferation,	global	
free	 trade,	 and	 energy	 security	 have	 failed.	 This	 realization	 is	
intensified	by	the	perception	that	time	is	running	out.	Problems	
are	outpacing	the	capacity	of	the	international	system	to	cope.	While	we	applaud	the	spread	of	
wealth	 and	prosperity,	 there	 is	 little	 indication	 that	 leaders	 and	 thinkers	 have	 anticipated	 the	
impact	of	the	creation	of	a	global	middle	class	in	a	world	of	limited	resources.	As	one	participant	
suggested,	perhaps	it	is	time	to	start	thinking	in	terms	of	“lose-lose”	solutions.	
Global	challenges	are	growing	as	the	mechanisms	of	governance,	the	tools	we	use	to	tackle	those	
problems,	are	being	undermined.	Unless	there	is	a	radical	shift	in	the	way	the	world’s	main	actors	
approach	 global	 challenges,	 the	 situation	will	 deteriorate.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 global	 leadership,	
political	leaders	and	other	decision-makers	will	muddle	through,	reacting	to	challenges	instead	
of	preventing	them.	Until	a	crisis	creates	a	sense	of	urgency,	responses	will	address	symptoms	
rather	than	root	causes.	In	short,	global	governance	will	be	limited	to	crisis	management.	
The	 new	 configuration	 of	 international	 relations	 is,	 by	 and	 large,	 inherently	 chaotic	 and	
ungovernable.	 Power	 is	 increasingly	 geographically	 dispersed	 and	 politically	 fragmented.	 It	 is	
shifting	from	established	Western	powers	to	emerging	countries,	but	also,	to	some	extent,	to	non-
state	actors	who	assume	previously	public	responsibilities	or	pursue	agendas	of	their	own.	This	
diffusion	of	power	is	creating	a	new	international	environment	that	defies	clear	definition.	In	our	
understanding,	the	new	global	order	cannot	be	accurately	described	as	a	multipolar	world,	in	which	
a	few	great	powers	are	setting	the	rules	of	the	game	and	disciplining	those	who	violate	them.	We	
see	little	agreement	on	what	those	powers	are,	their	willingness	to	work	together,	nor	the	efficacy	
of	actions	 if	and	when	 they	do.	But	 this	 is	not	a	world	 in	which,	as	 Ian	Bremmer	and	Nouriel	
Roubini	 have	 argued,	 “no	 single	 country	 or	 block	 of	 countries	 has	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
leverage	–	or	the	will	–	to	drive	a	truly	international	agenda.”6	Their	“G-Zero	world”	seems	too	
state-centric	to	grasp	contemporary	global	dynamics.	Nor	do	we	accept	Richard	N.	Haass‘	notion	of	
“nonpolarity:	a	world	dominated	not	by	one	or	two	or	even	several	states	but	rather	by	dozens	of	
actors	possessing	and	exercising	various	kinds	of	power.”7	But	while	we	do	not	envision	a	concert,	
cacophony	may	not	be	the	only	other	option.	
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6	 Ian	Bremmer	and	Nouriel	Roubini,	A	G-Zero	World.	The	New	Economic	Club	Will	Produce	Conflict,	Not	Cooperation,	in:	Foreign	
Affairs,	Vol.	90,	No.	2,	March/April	2011,	pp.	2-7	(quote:	p.	2).
7	 Richard	N.	Haass,	The	Age	of	Nonpolarity.	What	Will	Follow	U.S.	Dominance,	in:	Foreign	Affairs,	Vol.	87,	No.	3,	May/June	2008,	
pp.	44-56	(quote:	p.	44).
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What	does	this	mean?	Are	we	on	the	road	toward	a	world	of	anarchy	without	order	and	leadership?	
How	can	nonpolarity	be	managed?	Optimists	like	Henry	Kissinger	believe	functional	necessities	
will	eventually	overcome	a	power	vacuum	in	international	relations:	“It	is	said	that	nature	abhors	
a	vacuum;	so	does	the	international	system.	Chaos,	if	it	occurs,	will	sooner	or	later	settle	down	into	
a	new	order.”8	For	pessimists	like	Neil	Ferguson,	“a	world	without	power,”	is	very	well	conceivable,	
albeit	as	“the	anarchic	nightmare	of	a	new	Dark	Age.”9
Our	discussions	suggest	that	neither	scenario	is	ordained.	Global	
governance	will	become	more	difficult,	but	not	impossible.	Even	
in	a	world	without	powerful	organizing	forces,	there	are	magnetic	
pulls	 and	 tugs	 that	 can	align	nations	and	 facilitate	 cooperation	
and	 collaborative	 efforts.	 Let’s	 call	 this	 “weak	 polarity.”	A	 new	
international	order	will	not	emerge	spontaneously,	but	there	are	
many	things	that	can	and	should	be	done	to	foster	its	creation.	One	
defining	characteristic	of	the	emerging	new	age	is	that	power,	at	
least	in	the	sense	of	traditional	“hard”	power,	and	leadership	are	
less	linked.	In	the	absence	of	a	comprehensive,	unitary	approach	
to	global	governance,	new	forms	of	leadership	will	emerge,	not	as	
enduring	as	traditional	alliances	or	international	institutions,	but	
rather	patchworks	of	overlapping,	often	ad	hoc	and	 fragmented	
efforts,	involving	shifting	coalitions	of	state	and	non-state	actors	
concentrating	 on	 specific	 issues.	 The	 leadership	 exercised	 by	
“coalitions	of	 the	willing”	will	be	more	 fragmented,	 situational,	
and	volatile	than	previous	attempts.	But	they	nevertheless	might	
achieve	concrete	results.	
Multi-stakeholder	global	action	networks	concentrating	on	specific	
issues	 are	 an	 appropriate	 organizational	 structure	 for	 today’s	
world.	 Non-state	 actors,	 especially	 NGOs,	 social	 entrepreneurs	
and	civil	society	groups,	can	play	an	 important	role	 in	creating	
these	kinds	of	networks	that	span	geographical,	institutional,	and	
sectoral	 boundaries.	 Establishing	 more	 such	 transformational	
networks,	therefore,	would	be	a	step	forward.	Although	this	would	not	solve	all	challenges	of	the	
globalized	world,	it	would	help	manage	them	and	prevent	the	international	system	from	collapsing	
under	the	weight	of	its	collective	failures.	
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8	 Dr.	Henry	A.	Kissinger,	Keynote	Address	for	the	8th	IISS	Global	Strategic	Review	“Global	Security	Governance	and	the	Emerging	
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There	is	a	thick	layer	of	overlapping	and	competing	authorities	in	the	existing	system	of	global	
governance	and	most	emerging	countries	have	no	interest	in	upending	this	system;	they	prefer	
to	make	adjustments.	But,	 the	future	 international	order	will	be	no	mere	outgrowth	of	existing	
mechanisms.	 Planetary	 problems	 pose	 new	 challenges	 and	 require	 new	 problem-solving	
mechanisms	as	management	of	them	is	of	a	different	nature	and	dimension	than	past	challenges.	
The	lowest	common	denominator	is	no	longer	a	sufficient	starting	point	for	meaningful	coordinated	
action	on	the	global	 level.	Whether	this	means	the	creation	of	new	institutions	is	of	secondary	
importance.	Either	existing	intuitions	may	take	up	the	challenges	or	new	ones	will	be	created.	
There	is	a	lack	of	vision	about	the	future	of	the	international	system	and	the	emerging	global	order.	
To	facilitate	the	creation	of	such	a	vision,	the	following	questions	need	to	be	explored	in	greater	
depth:	who	is	rising	and	what	sort	of	institutional	structures	and	values	do	these	nations	support?	
How	can	the	EU	and	US	adapt	the	international	system	to	accommodate	the	views	and	preferences	
of	rising	countries	without	sacrificing	fundamental	interests	and	values?	How	can	rising	countries	
contribute	to	global	public	goods	without	sacrificing	their	 fundamental	 interests	 in	sovereignty	
and	domestic	development?	What	are	 the	mutual	 interests	and	shared	challenges	 that	 the	EU,	
the	US,	and	rising	countries	can	jointly	address?	How	do	the	regional	and	global	levels	interact?	
Finally,	how	can	the	contributions	of	non-state	actors	be	enhanced	and	leveraged?	Future	iterations	
of	the	Berlin	workshop	will	focus	on	these	questions.	
Concrete	measures	to	overcome	the	lack	of	trust	among	the	EU	
and	US	 and	 emerging	 countries	 are	 essential.	 This	 applies	not	
only	 to	 the	US	and	China	–	although	 this	bilateral	 relationship	
will	be	pivotal	for	the	entire	world	–	but	also	to	Europe	and	Asia.	
As	the	discussions	in	Berlin	crystallized,	there	is	an	urgent	need	
for	 a	more	 dynamic	 dialogue	 between	 Europe	 and	Asia.	While	
there	is	a	strong	trans-Atlantic	policy	community	that	 joins	the	
US	and	Europe,	a	similar	policy	community	between	Europe	and	
Asia	beyond	the	formal	Asia-Europe	Meeting	(ASEM)	is	needed	
to	 keep	 pace	with	 the	 agendas	 discussed	 in	 the	myriad	 policy	
dialogues	and	track	II	forums	in	the	Asia-Pacific	community.	
A policy community 
between Europe and Asia 
beyond the formal Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) is 
needed to keep pace with 
the agendas discussed in 
the myriad policy dialogues 
and track II forums in the 
Asia-Pacific community.
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The	continuation	of	the	trilateral	dialogue	initiated	by	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	and	the	Pacific	
Forum	CSIS	can	contribute	to	the	development	of	such	an	Asian-European-US	policy	community	
by	creating	a	network	of	distinguished	practitioners	and	experts.	Moreover,	it	can	and	should	focus	
on	trilateral	relations:	What	does	“Asia”	mean	for	the	trans-Atlantic	alliance	and	what	does	Europe	
mean	for	trans-Pacific	relations?	These	questions	are	not	yet	sufficiently	understood	and	debated.	
A	trilateral	dialogue	can	provide	a	forum	for	doing	exactly	that.	
Thus,	going	forward,	future	meetings	will	pay	greater	attention	and	focus	more	deeply	on	these	
questions	 as	 well	 as	 on	 emerging	 issues	 that	 transcend	 traditional	 concerns.	 Of	 particular	
importance	is	the	growing	influence	of	 innovative	technologies,	such	as	the	internet	and	social	
media	 that	have	 the	capacity	 to	destabilize	and	disrupt	 the	 international	system.	Likewise,	 the	
concept	of	global	public	goods	and	the	sharing	of	the	burdens	to	create	and	maintain	them	are	of	
paramount	importance.	
At	 the	 core	 of	 these	non-traditional	 issues	 are	 very	 often	 emergent	non-state	 actors,	 agents	 of	
change,	activists,	and	agitators	that	the	Berlin	workshop	outlined,	but	did	not	explore	in	full	detail	
and	depth.	There	is	a	need	for	dialogue	that	focuses	on	the	role	of	these	non-state	actors	and	their	
implications	for	the	international	system.	The	next	set	of	discussions,	therefore,	should	include	
these	emerging	actors	as	well.	
It	 is	especially	 important	 that	we	 identify	and	 reach	out	 to	 the	next	generation	of	 leaders	and	
decision	makers.	We	must	get	in	front	of	the	cycle	of	change,	to	hear	the	views	of	those	who	will	be	
in	positions	of	power	and	authority	so	that	we	understand	their	thinking	and	anticipate	the	future	
contours	of	our	world.	Equally	important	we	need	to	facilitate	a	dialogue	among	these	leaders	that	
builds	familiarity	and	confidence	among	them	so	that	they	begin	building	a	community	of	thinkers	
and	doers	that	is	ready	to	address	–	and	hopefully	solve	–	future	challenges.	
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A Trilateral Practitioners Workshop – Berlin, July 7-8, 2011
At	the	Global	Policy	Council	hosted	by	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	in	Berlin	in	2009,	Henry	Kissinger	
declared	 that	“We	will	be	 forced	 to	 -	and	we	should	anyway	–	 think	about	a	new	 international	
system”.	 As	 we	 think	 about	 creating	 a	 governance	 system	 for	 an	 increasingly	 dynamic	 and	
interdependent	world,	what	must	come	next?	This	workshop	looks	for	practical	answers	to	this	
question	and	examines	realistic	solutions.
July	6	 Arrival	of	participants	
7:00	pm	 Opening	Dinner
July 7 The Three Step Process Toward Global 
 Governance
Conference	venue:	 Bertelsmann	
	 Unter	den	Linden	1
	 10117	Berlin
9:00	am	–	9:20	am	 Welcome	Remarks
	 Andreas	Esche	
	 Director,	Program	Shaping	the	Global	Future,	Bertelsmann	Stiftung
	 	 	
	 Ralph	Cossa	
	 President,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
9:20	am	–	12:00	pm	 Identifying	the	top	global	risks	
Within	 a	 10-year	 time	 frame,	 what	 are	 the	 3-5	 greatest	 challenges	 to	 international	 order	 and	
stability?	Why	and	how	are	they	threatening?	How	are	these	challenges	evolving	over	time?	Is	the	
world	addressing	the	challenges	effectively?	How	do	we	prioritize	these	concerns?	
Moderator:	 Brad	Glosserman
	 Executive	Director,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
Introductory	Remarks:	 Mark	Leonard	(EU)
	 Ely	Ratner	(US)
	 Minh	Tuan	TA	(Asia)
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12:00	pm	–	1:30	pm	 Working	Lunch
1:30	pm	–	3:30	pm	 Identifying	Agents	of	Change	
Who	are	the	major	actors	in	the	international	system?	Is	this	still	a	state-centered	world?	Who	are	
the	key	non-state	actors?	What	is	their	impact	and	influence?	What	is	changing	in	the	way	the	
world	is	governed	and	why?	What	forces	are	at	work	on	the	international	system?	What	impact	do	
these	changes	have	on	national	security,	international	stability,	on	the	ability	of	states	to	control	
their	citizens,	on	the	effectiveness	of	non-state	actors?	
Moderator:	 Brad	Glosserman
	 Executive	Director,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
Introductory	Remarks:	 Axel	Berkofsky	(EU)
	 Daniel	Drezner	(US)
	 Fan	LI	(Asia)
3:30	pm	–	4:00	pm	 	Break
4:00	pm	–	5:30	pm	 	Identifying	elements	of	new	global	governance	
Are	there	or	should	there	be	universal	norms?	How	can	we	create	a	sustainable	balance	between	
national	political	policies	and	global	economic	policies?	How	should	we	address	the	imbalance?	
Should	some	current	institutions	be	terminated?	Which	institutions	should	be	reformed	and	how?	
Is	there	a	need	for	new	international/multilateral	Institutions?	What	kind	of	new	system	should	be	
in	place	and	who	should	be	designing	it?	
Moderator:	 Ting	XU
	 Senior	Project	Manager,	Bertelsmann	Foundation
Introductory	Remarks:	 Joern	Dosch	(EU)
	 Amy	Searight	(US)
	 Andre	Omer	Siregar	(Asia)
7:00	pm	 Dinner
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July 8  Three Regional Views of Global Governance
Conference	venue:	 Bertelsmann	
	 Unter	den	Linden	1
	 10117	Berlin
9:00	am	–	10:30	am	 Regional	views	of	the	International	System
A	senior	expert	from	each	region	provides	an	assessment	of	international	challenges	and	the	role	
that	his/her	region	plays	in	resolving	them.	(90	minutes)
Moderator:	 Ralph	Cossa
	 President,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
Panelists:	 James	F.	Hoge	Jr.
	 Chairman,	Human	Rights	Watch;	Former	Editor,	Foreign	Affairs
	 Rodolfo	C.	Severino
	 Head,	Institute	of	Southeast	Asian	Studies
	 Prof.	Dr.	Eberhard	Sandschneider	
	 Otto	Wolff-Director	of	the	Research	Institute	of	the	German	Council	
	 on	Foreign	Relations,	Berlin
10:30	am	–	11:00	am	 Break
11:00	am	–	1:00	pm	 Working	Group	discussion	continued:	
	 reflection	of	the	earlier	presentation	
What	is	the	emerging	global	political	order?	What	are	the	implications	of	the	trends	identified	in	
Day	1?	How	do	Asians	view	the	US	and	EU	and	their	role	in	global	governance?	How	do	Americans	
view	the	roles	of	Europeans	and	Asians	in	global	governance?	How	do	Europeans	view	the	roles	
of	Americans	and	Asian	 in	global	governance?		What	 futures	can	we	envision:	 is	 there	a	world	
without	the	West?	Is	the	transatlantic	concept	relevant	to	the	future?	Where	does	Asia	lie	in	the	
new	global	order?	Was	US	global	leadership	ever	real?	What	is	its	future?	What	is	the	meaning	
and	 significance	 of	 American	 exceptionalism?	What	 role	 do	 “middle	 powers”	 play	 in	 the	 new	
international	system?
Moderator:	 	 Ralph	Cossa
	 	 President,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
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1:00	pm	–	2:00	pm	 	 Lunch
2:00	pm	–	3:00	pm	 	 Assessments	and	wrap	up
In	the	final	session,	next	generation	participants	assess	the	views	of	the	senior	experts	in	light	
of	the	discussions	of	the	first	day.	To	what	extent	do	those	threat	assessments	correspond	to	the	
views	expressed	in	session	1?	Do	the	assessments	of	state	roles	match	next	generation	views	of	
the	international	system?	Do	generational	differences	yield	significant	differences	in	perspectives?	
Do	 regional	 perspectives	 differ?	What	 are	 the	 key	 areas	 of	 divergence	 and	 agreement	 in	 our	
discussions?	What	are	next	steps	for	the	group?	
Moderator:	 Peter	Walkenhorst
	 Senior	Project	Manager,	Bertelsmann	Stiftung
3:00	pm	–	3:15	pm	 Concluding	Remarks
	 Ralph	Cossa	
	 President,	Pacific	Forum	CSIS	
	 	 	
	 Andreas	Esche	
	 Director,	Program	Shaping	the	Global	Future,	Bertelsmann	Stiftung
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About the Bertelsmann Stiftung  
and the Pacific Forum CSIS
The	 Germany-based	 Bertelsmann	 Stiftung,	 founded	 in	 1977,	 is	 a	 private,	 independent	 and	
nonpartisan	 foundation	 that	 aims	 to	 identify	 societal	 challenges	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 and	develop	
solutions	to	them.	The	foundation	is	both	a	think	tank	and	an	agent	for	social	change.	Its	programs	
are	geared	towards	improving	education,	strengthening	a	just	and	sustainable	economic	system,	
promoting	preventative	healthcare	system,	and	enhancing	civil	society	and	greater	international	
understanding.	In	the	area	of	international	politics	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	has	gained	experience	
in	fields	such	as	democracy,	transformation,	and	migration,	as	well	as	European	integration	and	
global	governance.
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Based	 in	Honolulu,	 the	Pacific	 Forum	CSIS	 operates	 as	 the	 autonomous	Asia-Pacific	 arm	 of	
the	 Center	 for	 Strategic	 and	 International	 Studies	 in	Washington,	 DC.	 The	 Forum’s	 programs	
encompass	current	and	emerging	political,	security,	economic,	business,	and	oceans	policy	issues	
through	analysis	and	dialogue	undertaken	with	the	region’s	leaders	in	the	academic,	government,	
and	corporate	areas.	Founded	in	1975,	it	collaborates	with	a	broad	network	of	research	institutes	
from	around	the	Pacific	Rim,	drawing	on	Asian	perspectives	and	disseminating	project	findings	
and	recommendations	to	opinion	leaders,	governments,	and	members	of	 the	public	throughout	
the	region.
www.pacforum.org
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